Professional Associations and Qualified Pension Plans by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 37 | Issue 1 Article 4
Fall 1961
Professional Associations and Qualified Pension
Plans
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1961) "Professional Associations and Qualified Pension Plans," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 37: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol37/iss1/4
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
material in that the desired wide public circulation of the news element
of the work would have been accomplished as a result of the author's
initial distribution.
CONCLUSION
The works for hire rule, as it has been applied in the area of "gov-
ernment publications," is a valuable tool for allocating ownership of liter-
ary products between the employee and the government in cases where
the duties of the employee are readily ascertainable. In cases where the
duties of the employee are highly discretionary, however, the rule loses
most of its utility, and underlying policies appear to be the determinative
factors in the decisions of the courts. Where this is the case it might be
better if the courts would adopt an approach whereby the maximum bene-
fits of both policies-encouragement and wide dissemination-could be
realized. A copyright version of the patent "shop-right" rule could pro-
duce this result. Alternatively, when it is determined primarily on policy
considerations that ownership should vest in a high government official,
it could be held that his literary property is not divested by distribution
to the public, when the subject matter of the work is of current news
value, and it does not appear that the distribution was motivated by eco-
nomic self-interests.
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS AND QUALIFIED
PENSION PLANS
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 permits an employer to estab-
lish a pension plan for the benefit of his employees' and provides signifi-
cant tax benefits under a qualified plan. Pension plan benefits under the
Code are dependent upon the existence of an employer-employee relation-
ship,2 however, excluding self-employed persons from qualification. The
inequity under the Code is made especially apparent in the case of profes-
sional practitioners, who are self-employed not solely by choice but also
by the laws of most states. A person cannot, of course, be an employee
of himself or of a partnership in which he is a partner, and in most states
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401-404.
2. A trust created or organized in the United States and forming part of a stock
bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his
employees or their beneficiaries shall constitute a qualified trust under this section .
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a). (emphasis added.)
NOTES
the performance of professional services is not regarded as a proper pur-
pose for incorporation.3
If a pension plan can be established, the principal benefit is that
amounts contributed by an employer to an employee pension fund are
taxable only in the year in which distributions are made to the employee.4
The advantages of such a pension plan for professional people are ob-
vious, in that it provides a means for deferring tax payments to a later
year when a retired person would be in a lower tax bracket, as well as
enabling him to provide financial security for his retirement years in an
orderly manner.
The inequity' of the present situation is that many persons who may
have incomes comparable to the professional man's can receive these bene-
fits merely because they can be characterized as employees. The cor-
porate executive, for example, is an employee who is able to use a pension
plan to defer tax payments, whereas the self-employed doctor or lawyer
with a comparable income is unable to do so. The problems of providing
for a retirement fund are certainly as acute for the self-employed person
as for employees. Further, the inability to qualify for such a plan is not
restricted to the wealthy, as it includes sole proprietors and partners in
small businesses as well. The inability to qualify hinges only upon the
form in which one earns a living.
The problem was recognized some time ago, with remedial legisla-
tion attempted as early as 1952 in Congress, in a bill extending pension
plan benefits to the self-employed. 6 Similar bills have fallen short of
enactment since that time, and because of the opposition of the revenue-
conscious Treasury Department, it is uncertain if the law will be changed.
A bill is presently awaiting consideration by the Senate, after having
passed the House and receiving a favorable report from the Senate Fi-
nance Committee.'
In view of the uncertain fate of congressional legislation to alleviate
the plight of the self-employed person, the purpose of this note is to
analyze alternative solutions to the problem of qualification for pension
plan benefits under the Internal Revenue Code. The discussion is limited
3. See 13 Am. JUR., Corporations, § 837. But see note 76 infra.
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 402 (a) (1).
5. For an illustration of the inequity under the present law, see Keogh, Pensions
For the Self-Employed, 100 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 175 (1961).
6. H.R. 4371, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
7. H.R. 10, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. (1961). This bill passed the House by a voice
vote on June 5, 1961. The Senate Finance Committee's report appears in S. Rep. 992, 87th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1961). For a discussion of the bill, see Keogh, supra note 5; Haynes,
Professional Association Pension Plans, 5 So. TEx. L.J. 354, 367-8 (1961).
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to the medical and legal professions, but the alternatives are not neces-
sarily limited in their application to these professions.
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS: THE KINTNER AND MORRISSEY CASES
In the absence of legislative relief, a group of doctors in Montana
developed another approach to the problem by forming what is now
known as a "Kintner Association," whereby they became eligible for the
pension plan benefits. Since they were unable to incorporate for the
practice of medicine, they formed an unincorporated association to be
taxed as a corporation,' adopting articles of association whereby the re-
sulting organization took over the assets of their former partnership in
a medical clinic. The articles specified that the organization was to be
taxed as a corporation and ascribed to it some attributes of a corporation,
i.e., limited liability, continuity o fexistence, and centralized control.
Membership was restricted to licensed physicians. The association paid
salaries, furnished medical equipment, rented space, paid Social Security
and withholding taxes, and paid federal income and state and local taxes.
Also, of course, it provided a pension plan for the benefit of all "quali-
fied employees," i.e., those who had been employed at least three years
and were at least thirty years old. These qualifications included eleven
of the thirty-eight persons employed as of 1948, when the plan was ef-
fectuated, eight of whom were the doctors themselves. The Internal
Revenue Service decided that the money paid into the pension plan for a
defendant doctor was personal income, since the organization was not
qualified to be taxable as a corporation and thus a doctor could not be its
employee for pension plan purposes. The District Court granted a re-
fund of the taxes paid,' and the decision was affirmed on appeal in
United States v. Kintner."0
In deciding the case, the appellate court turned against the Internal
Revenue Service all of the arguments formerly made by the commissioner
in cases in which the government had attempted to include various organi-
zations as associations," i.e., as corporations for tax purposes. The court
held that regardless of what the state courts would label it for local law
purposes, the organization was a corporation under the federal tax laws
8. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 7701(a) (3), states that "the term 'corporation' includes
associations, joint stock companies, and insurance companies."
9. Kintner v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 976 (D.C. Mont. 1952).
10. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
11. The term "association" implies that an organization so called is a corporation
for federal tax purposes. See note 8 supra. Further, the recently-issued treasury regula-
tions state that "the term 'association' refers to an organization whose characteristics
require it to be classified for purposes of taxation as a corporation ... " Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(a) (1) (1960).
NOTES
and qualified for the pension plan benefits. Citing Pelton v. CoMm'r
as authority for the proposition that the local law does not bind the In-
ternal Revenue Service in characterization for tax purposes, the court
concluded:
It would introduce an anarchic element in federal taxation if
we determined the nature of associations by state criteria rather
than by special criteria sanctioned by the tax law, the regula-
tions and the courts. It would destroy the uniformity so essen-
tial to a federal tax system. .... "
The practice of medicine was not included in the Montana statutes 4
as one of the purposes for which a corporation could be formed so the
court assumed that it was not a proper purpose. In fact, the defendant
conceded that the association was probably a partnership under Mon-
tana's local law, but the court did not treat this as a material issue, since
it was concerned only with characterization for federal tax purposes. It
is not certain what situations would present a necessity for characterizing
an association for local law purposes, but apparently it had not been
necessary for the Kintner clinic prior to the tax litigation.
The Treasury Department refused to follow the court's ruling, an-
nouncing in 1956 that future organizations such as that found in the
Kintiner case would be classified as partnerships and would therefore be
unable to qualify for pension plan benefits." This statement was closely
followed by a 1957 pronouncement that the "usual" tests would be used
to determine if an organization more closely resembled a corporation or
a partnership." This statement confused more than it clarified the
qualification criteria since the natural questions raised were-what are
the "usual" tests, and if they are not changed, why would an association
like the Kintner association fail to pass them again in the future? The
Treasury Ruling did not specify what features of the Kintner association
were objectionable, thus providing no guide as to what features should be
avoided in seeking to qualify for pension plan benefits.
The term "association" has a very broad possible meaning. Until
recently " the Internal Revenue Service and Congress had both refrained
from a definition so it was left to the courts to provide content to the
12. 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
13. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 424 (9th Cir. 1954).
14. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 15-104 (1947).
15. REv. RUL. 56-23, 1956-1 Cumi. BULL. 598.
16. REv. RUL. 57-546, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 886-87.
17. The Treasury regulations issued in 1960 define the term. See note 11 supra.
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term. In Morrissey v. Conm'r8 the Supreme Court made the most com-
plete attempt, up to that time, to establish a definition of "associations,"
and the regulations and the subsequent decisions have built upon that
case. Although in that case the court was examining a business trust, it
dealt rather generally with the concept of associations. The attributes
compiled are (1) associates, (2) a business purpose, and (3) corporate
resemblance. The factors to be considered in determining if sufficient
corporate resemblance exists are (a) continuity of existence, (b) cen-
tralized management, (c) transferability of interests in the organization
without affecting its continuity, (d) limitation of personal liability of
the associates, and (e) title to property vested in the entity.
Since the court in the Morrissey case was concerned with the charac-
terization of a business trust, more emphasis was placed upon the busi-
ness purpose requirement than would be true if a professional association
were being examined, as the business purpose test is usually the difficult
one for a trust to meet. A business trust, by necessity, must be distin-
guished from an ordinary non-business trust. The professional associa-
tion is likely to have a clear business purpose' but faces the difficulty
of proving that sufficient corporate resemblance exists, as opposed to
partnership resemblance. On this point the court said:
The inclusion of associations with corporations implies
resemblance; but it is resemblance and not identity. The re-
semblance points to features distinguishing associations from
partnerships as well as from ordinary trusts. . . . (T)he clas-
sification cannot be said to require organization under a statute,
or with statutory privileges. The term embraces associations
as they may exist at the common law."
This statement suggests that the courts wilt be engaged in a com-
parative operation, looking at a particular professional organization and
examining its characteristics to determine whether those characteristics
are more similar to those of a corporation (making the organization an
association) or of a partnership.
The court also noted that the name that a group gives itself will not
be very persuasive, as the court is interested not in what attributes the
organization ascribes to itself but in the attributes actually possessed by
18. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
19. This is true unless "business purpose" can be held to differ from "professional
purpose." The distinction would seem unsound, but it can be argued. For example, the
Indiana General Corporation Act permits incorporation for "any lawful business pur-
pose," but the professions cannot incorporate in Indiana. See notes 55 and 56 infra.
20. Morrisey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344, 357-58 (1935).
NOTES
the organization. Thus merely calling the managing committee a board
of directors will not be persuasive if it does not have the powers usually
possessed by a corporate board of directors.
ASSOCIATION OR PARTNERSHIP: THE CORPORATE RESEMBLANCE TEST
Several cases on the classification of organizations as associations or
partnerships21 have relied upon one or more of the requisite attributes
compiled in the Morrissey case. A look at a few cases dealing with fac-
tors involved in corporate resemblance may give some assistance in de-
termining what is necessary to meet the requirements for qualification as
an association. In looking at each point, it must be remembered that
any corporation22 can qualify for a pension plan, so examination of close-
ly held corporations will show their similarity to those professional
organizations which presently cannot qualify. This comparison demon-
strates the inequity of excluding these organizations from pension plan
benefits.
Continuity. This test is difficult to meet. In that continuity is a
corporate feature granted by statute, the problem turns upon what degree
of continuity less than perpetuity will meet the requirement. 2 It may be
sufficient if the agreement creating the association provides that a mem-
ber's interest shall pass to his heirs, legatees, or legal representative at
death.24 The power of a majority to dissolve the organization probably
will not cause it to fail the continuity test, because this is also true of
some corporations.2" A mere voluntary association dependent on the
cooperation of each individual for its continued existence, however, will
probably not qualify. The minimal requirement is an association con-
tinuing for a reasonable time with some binding rights and obligations
between the parties.
Centralized inaiagement. The critical element in this test is the ex-
istence of representative administration, as opposed to each shareholder
21. In the cases discussed in this section, the characterization was not with reference
to pension plan benefits. It should be noted that there are disadvantages as well as ad-
vantages resulting from characterization as a corporation (which includes association).
See Lyon, Action in Indiana on Kintner-Type Organizations, 39 TAXES 266, 268-70
(1961).
22. It is assumed that any organization incorporated under the laws of a state has
the attributes of corporate resemblance to a degree sufficient for qualification. Now
that states are beginning to permit incorporation of professions under special statutes
which provide for many partnership resemblance attributes, there may be some question
as to whether any corporation can qualify. See note 76 infra.
23. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1960) (discussing continuity of life).
24. Bloomfield Ranch v. Comm'r, 167 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1948); but cf. United
States v. Carter, 101 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1939).
25. Marshall's Heirs v. Comm'r, 111 F.2d 935 (3rd Cir. 1940).
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representing only his own interests.26 This does not mean that all the
shareholders cannot be on the managing committee or that all the mem-
bers of the committee cannot be shareholders; but it must be shown that
each member of the committee represents the interests of all and owes a
duty to all other shareholders in the decisions made." There is no in-
herent harm in having the owners of a business as a part of the con-
trolling group, as this is often true in corporations of all sizes; and in
some corporations the directors are required to have a proprietary in-
terest. Therefore, it would not seem that disinterested representatives are
a necessary characteristic of an association in order to determine that it
resembles a corporation. Just as is true in close corporations, however,
there are problems concerning the degree of control which the managing
committee has over basic decisions of the organization, such as the set-
ting of salaries, location of the business, and dissolution. As to these
decisions, individual members may want veto power, which power dis-
torts the image of centralized management.
Transferable interests. The necessary degree of freedom of trans-
ferability is somewhat uncertain. It is unlikely that any professional
association would allow complete freedom. Some restrictions are also
common in close corporations. Therefore, completely free transfer-
ability would not seem to be necessary. The test, basically, turns upon
the ability of one person to transfer his interest to a substitute without the
consent of the other associates. In some cases, however, unanimous con-
sent of the other associates was required by the organization and it was
held to be an association. 29
It would seem unnecessary to have certificates of beneficial interest
or machinery established to effect transfers in order to qualify.3" This
would be quite cumbersome for a small association and would not be par-
ticularly persuasive as a feature of corporate resemblance.
Professional associations would find complete freedom of transfer-
ability an acute problem, since the nature of the relationship involved is
usually very personal. Few professional people would accept association
with any person foisted upon them by an associate eager to sell his in-
26. Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 334 (1925); see Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)
(1960) (discussing centralized management).
27. Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert, 296 U.S. 369 (1935).
28. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (1960) (discussing free transferability of
interests).
29. Fidelity Bankers Trust Co. v. Helvering, 113 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1940);
Wholesalers' Adjustment Co. v. Comm'r, 88 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1937).
30. Comm'r v. Horseshoe Leace Syndicate, 110 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1940). Here
the associates had undivided fractional interests in the property, but no shares of stock.
The court indicated that this did not impair the transferability of the interests.
NOTES
terest. Perhaps some type of "first offer" arrangement could be made,
as is frequently done in close corporations, whereby if an associate wants
to sell his interest, the first offer must be made to the association or to
the individual associates."' A funded life insurance plan might be estab-
lished to purchase the interest of deceased associates. The minimal re-
quirement is that there be some possibility of transferability, even if it is
limited to the right to sell only to the other associates, which in a partner-
ship would bring about a dissolution.
Limited personal liability. This is the most unique attribute of a
corporation and is rather difficult to attain without statutory authoriza-
tion.3" Parties may be able to limit their liabilities to each other by agree-
ment, but it is difficult to establish limited liability as to third persons
merely by claiming it. For tax purposes, however, at times the courts
have treated the mere claim of limitation as sufficient.3 In fact, in one
case, the court said that the statement by the members of the association
that it was not meant to be a partnership was sufficient to show that they
intended to limit personal liability.34
There is a strong public policy against limiting personal liability in
the practice of medicine, but the recognition of limited liability of an as-
sociation similar to that in a corporation need not seriously contravene
that policy. The tortfeasor's individual liability would remain, and a
new remedy would be created in the association's liability as an entity, so
an injured person would have an increased likelihood of finding a solvent
defendant. The only actual limitation of liability would be as to the
personal property of members of the association other than the member
who commits the tort, i.e., a limitation analogous to that of a stockholder
for torts of agents of the corporation.3" A requirement that professional
associations carry liability insurance would mitigate, if not destroy, the
argument against the limiting of personal liability.
The limiting of liability for contracts is not so great a problem, since
the arguments for the equities of the prospective plaintiff are not as com-
pelling in the contract field as in the personal injury field. Most persons
31. The "first offer" arrangement qualifies as a "modified form of free transfer-
ability" under the treasury regulations. See note 28 supra.
32. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1960) (discussing limited liability).
33. Comm'r v. Heating-Snyder Trust, 126 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1942).
34. Comm'r v. Fortney Oil Co., 125 F.2d 995 (6th Cir. 1942). The agreement of
the associates stated that the organization was not to be construed as a partnership.
In this case the commissioner, rather than the associates, claimed that the organization
was an association. This argument would perhaps be less appealing to the commissioner
when presented by an organization seeking to qualify for pension plan benefits.
35. In a partnership the partnership and the individual partners are jointly and
severally liable for torts of a partner committed in the ordinary course of partnership
business. UNIFORm PARTNERSHaIP AcT § 13.
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dealing on a contractual basis deal with knowledge of the association's
characteristics and could provide for liability in the terms of the contract.
Professional associations would differ little from many ordinary cor-
porations in their contractual relationships.
Title vested in an entity. This is the last and certainly least impor-
tant test set out in the Morrissey case. In Conr'r v. Fortney Oil Co."
the court mentioned this test and held that even though the members of
the association were tenants in common the organization was still an as-
sociation, since the other attributes were present. Since many types of
partnerships are also able to hold title to land, this is not a very important
distinguishing factor."
THE TREASURY REGULATIONS AND LOCAL LAW PROBLEMS
The treasury regulations. The aggregate of the case law on this
subject is not a sufficient guide for a group which has decided that it
would like to form an association in order to qualify for pension plan
benefits. In the past, additional uncertainty was created by the knowl-
edge that more complete regulations were forthcoming. The issuance
of the complete regulations was eagerly awaited, but the appearance of
the regulations38 has not completely clarified the requirements for quali-
fication as an association. The basic Morrissey requirements are em-
bodied within the regulations and some explanations and examples are
provided, but important questions remain unanswered. Two examples of
medical associations are provided, one of which qualifies," and one of
which does not.4" The example of a qualified association does not have
limited liability, but it does have centralized management, continuity of
existence, and a modified form of transferability. The example of a
non-qualifying association has only associates for a business purpose, so
it is characterized as a partnership. The non-qualifying example indi-
cates that some of the tests for corporate resemblance must be met, while
the qualifying example establishes that meeting the three listed tests is
sufficient. Questions then arise as to whether meeting any three of the
five tests is sufficient and whether the two requirements not listed in
the qualifying example are less persuasive of corporate resemblance than
the three listed. By referring to the other qualifying example,4' a real
36. 125 F.2d 995 (6th Cir. 1942).
37. This factor is omitted from the treasury regulations. See Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-2 (1960).
38. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1-301.7701-11 (1960).
39. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) (1) (1960).
40. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) (2) (1960).
41. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) (5) (1960).
NOTES
estate association, it may be concluded that it will also be sufficient to
have limited liability, centralized management, and transferability of in-
terests, without continuity of life. Does this lead to the conclusion that
meeting any three of the tests will result in qualification? The conclu-
sion is not clear, nor is it clear what will constitute meeting each test in
each fact situation.42 Therefore, it is necessary to refer to the case law
to aid in the solution of these problems.
In viewing a particular organization, the courts have allowed the re-
quirements of each test to vary in relation to the completeness of satisfac-
tion of the other tests. There can be greater restrictions on transfer-
ability, for example, if there is a completely effective limitation of lia-
bility. Thus the courts will weigh all of the factors of corporate resem-
blance, as opposed to partnership resemblance, to find which of the two
types of organization is more closely approximated by the organization
under consideration. This is important to remember in planning an as-
sociation, because it is unlikely that meeting the minimum requirements
of each test will create a strong case for qualification. 3
Therefore, the new regulations give some assistance by providing
some details as to the requirements for qualification as an association, but
the regulations must be supplemented by what the courts have said in
cases in which organizations have been taxed as corporations in the past.
The regulations and the cases must then be considered in relation to the
organizational possibilities available under the local law.
Local law problem. The frequent references to the local law in the
regulations make the problems of "would be associates" even more com-
plex. The regulations emphasize that the tests for determining in which
category (association or partnership) an organization falls are deter-
mined by the Internal Revenue Code. Therefore, the fact that a state
would characterize an organization as a partnership does not preclude the
commissioner from characterizing it as an association, i.e., as a corpora-
tion for tax purposes. The local law governs, however, in the determina-
tion of the "legal relationships of the members of the organization among
themselves and with the public at large."46  In other words, if under the
42. The regulations briefly discuss the necessary characteristics required for central
management, limited liability, etc. See notes 23, 26, 28, and 32 supra.
43. It should be noted that qualification as an association is separate from the
problem of an unincorporated business enterprise qualifying for election to be taxed as a
corporation under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1361. A partner or proprietor of a business
qualifying under § 1361 is not an employee for purposes of § 401. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 1361 (d).
44. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960) (discussing the effect of local law in
characterizing an organization).
45. Supra note 44.
46. Ibid.
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local law, such attributes as limited liability and centralized management
are not possible, then an organization formed in that state will be unable
to qualify as an association.
Reference to differing state laws in the application of federal law
can only cause diversity in results in the application of the federal law.
The problem is aggravated by the lack of clarity in the relevant laws of
some states, resulting from the absence of statutes and the lack of litiga-
tion on some issues. The only conclusion seems to be that the regulations
are severely limited in their application, since the tests for corporate re-
semblance are almost impossible to fulfill under the laws of many states,
and in other states the law is too uncertain to provide a basis for a con-
clusion as to whether or not qualification is possible.
This problem is complicated even more by the attitude of the courts,
who often seem to disregard the local law by indicating that they do not
care if the association actually has the attributes that it claims. In a case
arising in Illinois,47 although corporations were prohibited from practic-
ing medicine, a group of doctors formed a clinic organization. The clinic
was organized for a ten year period with a central management, trans-
ferable shares, and limitation of personal liability. The court stated that
while a corporation cannot practice medicine, the characterization at issue
was only for federal tax purposes, and, in spite of the desires of the
doctors, the organization was held to be taxable as a corporation.
The Kintner case also shows the court's lack of concern with the ex-
istence of the attributes claimed under the state laws, because it was not
clear under the local law that the association in Kintner possessed all the
attributes it claimed. Unless there is some way of testing these ques-
tions for local law purposes, it is difficult to see how a court can decide
if an association has attained the necessary attributes. The courts could
continue to do as they seem to have done in some cases, i.e., assume that
the requirements have been met under the local law where there is no
indication to the contrary.
QUALIFICATION AS AN ASSOCIATION: THE ORGANIZATIONAL
POSSIBILITIES
Common law associations. Looking at common law unincorporated
associations as they are found throughout the country, the cases contri-
bute little clarification on the effectiveness of the claims of corporate
attributes under the local law. These associations are generally con-
sidered merely as consensual creations of the participants and not as le-
47. Pelton v. Comm'r, 82 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1936).
NOTES
gal entities, since a private group cannot create a legal entity without
statutory authorization."8 There must, by definition, be at least two per-
sons associated; therefore a sole proprietorship cannot qualify as a com-
mon law association.49  Generally, an association can neither sue nor
be sued, 0 but, sometimes, the courts will recognize it as a defendant.5
The many features of associations which are unsettled, however, consti-
tute a major stumbling block, preventing professional groups from or-
ganizing in this form. If a group drafted an agreement claiming all the
necessary features for tax purposes, and if it were apparent that the
claims were exaggerated, a court might hold it taxable as a partnership,
labelling the attempt as a sham and subterfuge to gain a tax advantage.52
Thus, unless some reasonably certain means of organization is avail-
able which has proven local law acceptability, it is unlikely that many
groups would be willing to risk organizing only to discover that their
effort was ineffective under the federal tax law. It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that as recently as 1959 a group of doctors was successful in quali-
fying as an association merely by claiming the necessary attributes. A
District Court in Texas held in Galt v. U.S." that, although there was no
clear indication that the claimed attributes were actually attained, the
court was satisfied that the organization had sufficient corporate resem-
blance. The subsequent issuance of the regulations has detracted from
the strength of this case as a precedent, however.
To determine if it is possible to organize in some form providing a
reasonable likelihood of qualification, it is necessary to examine all organ-
izational forms available in a particular state.
Indiana associations. Taking Indiana as an example, the alternative
forms of organization are rather limited and ill-defined. If it were pos-
sible to organize a professional corporation, the problem would probably
be solved. 4 The corporate practice of professions is not expressly pro-
hibited in the Indiana statute, in that the statute states, "Corporations
may be organized for pecuniary profit under this act for any lawful busi-
48. State v. Cosgrove, 36 Ida. 278, 210 Pac. 393 (1922).
49. Knoxville Truck Sales & Service, Inc., 10 T.C. 616 (1948).
50. Forest City Mfg. Co. v. Int'l Ladies Garment Workers Union, 233 Mo. App.
935, 111 S.W.2d 934 (1938).
51. Clark v. Grand Lodge, 328 Mo. 1084, 43 S.W.2d 404 (1931).
52. "A man can select any means he wants to avoid or minimize taxes, but the
means he uses cannot be subterfuge or sham." Particelli v. Comm'r., 212 F.2d 498 (9th
Cir. 1959).
53. 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
54. The professional corporation would have to possess some of the corporate
resemblance factors, i.e., the factors would have to be permissible under the local law.
The mere fact that a state characterizes a professional organization as a corporation
does not assure that it will be so characterized under the Internal Revenue Code. See
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960).
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ness purpose. . . . "" The list of exceptions which follows does not in-
clude professions, but the few cases which have considered the question
have held that corporations are precluded from practicing the profes-
sions,56 without citing Indiana statutes for support.
Assuming that there can be no corporate practice of professions
under the present laws, the alternative organizational possibilities should
be briefly examined to see if one of them might provide a means of
qualification for pension plan benefits.
(1) Joint stock companies are seldom referred to in the Indiana
law, although there are a few general references to them in the statutes.5"
Some states have rather limited statutory authorization, but generally
stock companies are a common law creation. In some states, stock com-
panies may have a degree of continuity,"s internal management controlled
by the agreement,5" and some transferability of interests,6" but limitation
of liability is not allowed.61 The absence of applicable Indiana law on these
points probably precludes the use of a professional joint stock company
as a method of qualification for pension plan benefits, because the un-
certainty would necessitate litigation in order to clarify the status of the
organization.
(2) The Massachusetts or business trust is generally conceded to
be illegal in Indiana, but the only case on the subject did not rule directly
on this issue. 2 The court in that case indicated a relatively hostile atti-
tude toward business trusts, noting that they were allowed in Massachu-
setts only as a result of statutory authorization. Thus the business trust,
too, is probably ruled out by the uncertainty of its validity in Indiana and
the likelihood that an attempted association in this form would be de-
clared invalid.
(3) Partnerships are the subject of a great deal of statutory and
case law in Indiana, but since the Uniform Partnership Act is in effect,
it is certain that many of the necessary attributes of a qualifying associa-
tion could not be attained under that statute. 3 The tax regulations refer
55. IiND. ANN. STAT. § 25-201 (Bums 1960).
56. Iterman v. Baker, 214 Ind. 308, 15 N.E.2d 365 (1938) (medicine); State v.
Boston System Dentists, 215 Ind. 485, 19 N.E.2d 949 (1939) (dentistry); Groninger
v. Fletcher Trust Co., 220 Ind. 202, 41 N.E.2d 140 (1941) (law).
57. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-113, 52-1530, 4-2608 (Bums 1933).
58. Industrial Lumber Co. v. Texas Pine Land Ass'n, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 875, 72
S.W. 875 (1903).
59. Cross v. West Va. Cent. & P. Ry., 37 W. Va. 342, 16 S.E. 587 (1892).
60. Goodspeed v. Halley, Wayne Circuit Judge, 199 Mich. 273, 165 N.W. 943 (1917).
61. In re Jones' Estate, 172 N.Y. 575, 65 N.E. 570 (1902).
62. McClaren v. Dawes Electric Sign & Mfg. Co., 86 Ind. App. 196, 156 N.E. 584(1927).
63. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 50-401-03 (Burns 1953).
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specifically to the Uniform Act, stating that organizations formed under
that act cannot meet the tests."4
(4) The common law unincorporated association is the last pos-
sible form for organization in Indiana. There are a few cases concern-
ing them in Indiana, but the cases leave many questions unanswered. The
cases deal with organizations for other than strict business purposes, such
as churches,"3 unions," or employer associations.8" Concerning the rele-
vant factors for qualification for the pension plan benefits, there are
some very real uncertainties. Unincorporated associations are precluded
from holding property." As to continuity, it is uncertain whether an
agreement to continue for a specified term will be effective." The law
on centralized management is also uncertain. A few groups have claimed
central management, but there is no clear holding on the validity of these
claims."0 The limitation of liability to third persons is not possible, be-
cause unincorporated associations are treated as partnerships as to lia-
bility."' There has apparently been no litigation on the transferability of
interests, but it is probably safe to assume that where in doubt, the court
will treat these associations as partnerships." The few statutory refer-
ences are merely inclusions within the definitions of "persons" for the
purposes of a particular statute.7" Thus the conclusion as to this form
of organization is that the concept of an unincorporated association
". .. is not of uniform meaning, but is rather vague."'" The only large
scale use of this form of organization is in agricultural co-operatives, but
they are not very helpful guides since they are closely regulated by
statutes.
75
64. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (2) and (d) (1) (1960).
65. State ex rel. Hatfield v. Cummins, 171 Ind. 112, 85 N.E. 359 (1908).
66. State ex rel. Givens v. Marion Superior Ct., 233 Ind. 235, 117 N.E.2d 553 (1953).
67. Androft v. Building Trades Employer's Ass'n of the Calumet District, 83 Ind.
App. 294, 148 N.E. 203 (1925).
68. Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local 131, 165 Ind. 421,
75 N.E. 877 (1905).
69. Rand Receiver v. Wright, 141 Ind. 226, 39 N.E. 447 (1894). Here a partner-
ship agreement stated that it would be effective for five years, plus a two year renewal
period. A partner's death during the two year extension did not result in a dissolution,
but it is uncertain if this was a result of the original agreement or a 'result of the
formation of a new partnership with the deceased's representative.
70. See Manning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399 (1866). Here a store was organized
as an association at common law having a managing committee. The court did not rile
on the powers of the committee in deciding the case.
71. Kenyon v. Williams, 19 Ind. 44 (1862).
72. See Manning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399 (1866) ; Lowe v. Blair, 72 Ifid.-281 (1880).
73. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-1113, 8-201, 12-303, 64-2601 (Burns 1933).
74. Weir v. United States, 92 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1937) (Applying Indiana law).
75. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 15-1600-34 (Bums 1950).
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A STATUTORY REMEDY: INCORPORATION UNDER THE LOCAL LAW
It is clear that under the present Indiana law, it is impossible to form
a professional association. Therefore, any local law remedy would re-
quire statutory action. As was true in many states/ 6 an attempt was
made in the 1961 session of the Indiana General Assembly to enact a
"Professional Corporations" statute. This bill was drafted for the
purpose of making pension plan benefits available to the professions.
The bill passed the Senate by an overwhelming majority but failed in
the House.
As originally drafted, the bill purported to make it possible for
nearly all professional people, including certified public accountants,
chiropractors, dentists, osteopaths, physicians and surgeons, attorneys and
life insurance agents, to organize a corporation. A corporation of this
type could practice only one of the professions, and only persons licensed
to practice that profession could organize or hold shares in such a cor-
poration. The corporation could own the property necessary to perform
its services ahd could invest its excess funds. Provision was made to
allow it to employ clerks and bookkeepers, etc., but the corporation could
render services to the public only through licensed members of the pro-
fession. The law was to remain unchanged regarding the relationship
between the professional person and the recipient of the services, with the
express stipulation that the liability of the professional person would
remain unchanged. If a shareholder were subsequently disqualified from
the practice of his profession, he would have to sever his relationship
with the corporation. The corporate name would have to include names
of some associates as well as an appropriate label for the corporation,
such as the word "chartered." The remainder of the provisions were
covered by incorporating by reference much of the Indiana General Cor-
poration Act.'
It is certain that if the proposed statute had been enacted, it would
have provided a means for qualification for the pension plan benefits,
regardless of what other uncertainties it may have created. It provided
for at least as much compliance as the qualifying example of a medical
clinic in the regulations.
76. The attempts have been successful in at least five states at the time of this
writing. See OHIo REv. CoDE ANN. § 1785.01-08 (Page 1961 Supp.); FLA. LAWS 1961,
ch. 61-64, at p. 82; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.99 (Wests 1961) ; PA. STAT. tit. 14, § 197-1-19
(1961) ; ILL. LAws. 1961, S.B. 804.
77. S.B. 73 and H.B. 33, Ind. General Assembly, 1961 Sess. The Bill is discussed
and the text is printed in Lyon, Action in Indiana on Kintier-Type Organizations, 39
TAXEs 266, esp. 273 (1961).
78. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-202 (Burns 1960).
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A factor to be noted is the possibility that if such a bill is proposed
again, some of the professions may be excluded from its coverage. For
example, there were amendments to the proposed bill excluding life in-
surance agents and attorneys. If the concept of professional corpora-
tions is acceptable, there would seem to be little justification for ex-
cluding certain professions.
The idea of professional corporations is offensive to many. The
usual arguments advanced against the corporate practice of professions 9
rely upon the alleged inability of a corporation to take a proficiency ex-
amination or an oath and the alleged inability of organizations such as
the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association to
discipline a corporation. These arguments lack cogency if all the mem-
bers of the corporation are licensed practitioners, because the individuals
can still take examinations, be subject to discipline, and take the neces-
sary oath. A more valid argument is the fear that the normal relationship
between the attorney and client or doctor and patient, for example, would
be altered. Perhaps a closer look at the legal profession, however, would
indicate that there is already a great deal of corporate resemblance in
existing organizations. In many law firms, the associates may feel a
greater loyalty to the firm than to the client, since in many respects they
are working only for the firm.
On the other hand, if the only reason for incorporating a profes-
sional practice is to qualify for pension plan benefits, it is questionable if
passing a new statute in fifty states is justified. The more direct and
effective method would be to make the change at the focal point, i.e., the
Internal Revenue Code. Even if widespread local law authorization of
professional incorporation develops, the professional person who wishes
to remain a partner or an individual practitioner is unable to qualify for
pension plan benefits. The proposed congressional legislation would re-
move this inequity, also."0
79. For a discussion of the arguments against professional corporations, see Lewis,
Corporate Capacity to Practice Law-A Study in Legal Hocus Pocus, 2 MD. L. REv.
342 (1938).
80. See H.R. 10, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. (1961). The discussion here is limited to
professional practitioners, but the Bill extends to other self-employed persons.
